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This paper argues for a closer association between economics and sociology. The latter
could benefit from the intellectual rigour of the former. Building a unified socio-econo-
mics requires an intellectual rapprochement between the sociologist conception of social inte-
raction and a relaxed version of rational choice. Evolutionary game theory may provide
one way forward.
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Resumen. Perspectivas para una ciencia social unificada: economía y sociología
Este artículo argumenta a favor de una colaboración más estrecha entre la economía y la
sociología. Esta última podría beneficiarse del rigor intelectual de la primera. La cons-
trucción de una socio-economía unificada requiere de una aproximación intelectual entre
la concepción sociológica de la interacción social y una versión suavizada de la elección
racional. La teoría de juegos evolucionaria puede proporcionar una camino prometedor
en ese sentido.
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There are two rather compelling reasons for posing the question as to whether
a unified social science is a realizable possibility. First, and most obviously, the
query itself is intellectually intriguing —can we cogently conceive of such a
‘science’1 and, if so, what would be involved in laying out its foundational pre-
cepts? Secondly, and less obviously, though of equal importance, there is a
politico-intellectual reason. The standards of rigour and sustained reasoning
being so variable across the social sciences, one might hope that any attempt to
open up the debate surrounding the issues of unification may have the effect
of driving them up. Unacceptable standards are currently widespread and
maintained, first, because some disciplines are effectively insulated in the uni-
versities behind departmental, disciplinary boundaries and, secondly, because
those working to higher standards, whilst being entirely aware of this situa-
tion, tend merely to shrug their shoulders with an air of resignation. This
seems to me to be morally unacceptable, so one of my objectives in writing
this paper is to stimulate a cross-disciplinary debate, which may in turn fos-
ter the spread of better practice. I trust this may be a realizable possibility even
if unification proves to be but a mirage.
We should start by asking which of the current array of disciplines might
be candidates for unification. I shall restrict my attention to economics and
sociology and, in a very much more limited way, to psychology. This restric-
tion reflects my own limitations. I write as a sociologist with a lamentably
amateur knowledge of economics and psychology but I suspect what I have
to say may well have wider implications.There is an obvious sense in which
my title is over-ambitious as I shall not reach for unification across the full
range of the social sciences. I prefer, however, to remain with the ambitious
title in the hope that others, more competent than I, may join the debate 
—perhaps in the pages of this exciting journal.
A good way to start is by clarifying the intellectual role which the word
‘social’ might be allowed to perform in our endeavours. A simple diagram which
I have found useful in this respect is depicted in Figure 12. It points to four types
of explanatory questions, each of which at least one of the established social sci-
ences addresses, and all of which when taken together provide a focus for uni-
fication. I shall use the word ‘social’ to indicate that we are usually concerned
with explaining a (macro) state of the (social) system (i.e. at the top right-hand
corner of the diagram). That is to say, it is not, in general, an ambition of the social
sciences to explain per se individual states/actions (i.e. the bottom right-hand
1. I shall use the term ‘science’ although I know in some quarters it proves controversial. I
would be entirely happy for the word to be replaced by a less controversial one. Nothing
in what follows entails a commitment to continuity with natural science.
2. The diagram is sometimes called the Coleman Diagram after Coleman (1990). It should be
clear that it could be elaborated (a) so that more than two ‘levels’ are involved (e.g. indi-
vidual, group, organization, industry, society) and (b) forwards and backwards in time. See
Abell (2001). I drop this complexity for the purpose of this paper.
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mitted to contribute to explanations of macro states3. Examples could be an
(equilibrium) price in competitive markets (from economics) or levels of group
cohesion or collective social capital (from sociology).
The arrows in the diagram can stand for a number of types of connection
or explanation (causal, aggregation, definitional or even emergence in the
case of arrow 3), but for the moment it will expedite the argument to think
solely in terms of causal explanations. Consequently, the diagram invites us to
speculate about the interplay of four types of causal mechanism. In general,
we may conceive of dynamical systems (which may or may not be tending
to a steady state) at two different levels of abstraction (see footnote 3), the
macro and the micro, and pose the question as to their interrelationship.
Sociologists will recognize type 4 explanations as essentially Durkheimian;
here a prior state of the (social) system causes (ceteris paribus) a later state of
the system. Thus, following Durkheim, exogenously established societal norms
cause (ceteris paribus) societal rates of suicide. Durkheim argued that such
(causal) mechanisms should be conceived as operating sui generis, at the soci-
etal level and, as a consequence, appropriately analysed independently of
mechanisms 1, 2 and 34. An economic example of a type 4 mechanism might
3. Sociologists would perhaps also use the word ‘social’ to emphasize that level 2 explanations
(Figure 1) concern the social interaction of at least two actors (see below). Despite my
emphasis on explanations of macro states many sociologists often seem unsure as to whether
the bottom or top right-hand corner of Figure 1 is the source of explanatory attention.
This may be because explanations of type 3 are sometimes no more than a summary or
aggregate measure of the distribution of actions/states at the micro level (e.g. the average
voting intention). Again, I shall return to these matters.
4. Durkheim, we are told, regarded this approach (i.e. analysis without micro reduction) as
justifying sociology as an independent discipline. I am told that Durkheim had a much
more complex viewpoint.
Figure 1.
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um) price. Economists are, however, much less prone than sociologists to
analyse level 4 relationships as sui generis. Nevertheless, a debate continues
about whether and, if so, how macro economics should be securely derived
from micro foundations. I will return to the nature of this quest but we may
note, in passing, that it suggests an encounter with the other three types of
mechanism depicted in Figure 1, though, in fact, type 1 explanations are
rarely sought by economists5.
In general, however, for those social scientists who do not care to adopt
a strict Durkheimian perspective, there is an obvious sense in which they will
be inclined to see type 4 explanations as, in some manner, derivative of the
conjunction of types 1, 2 and 3. So, for example, to take a non-Durkheimian
interpretation of suicide rates (top right-hand corner of Figure 1) one would
search for types of mechanisms whereby (exogenous) societal norms6 impact
(type 1) the conditions of individual interactions, then (type 2) where the
conditions impact the individual propensity to suicide and, finally, (type 3)
where the propensities aggregate7 to societal rates of suicide. This simple
depiction glosses over a number of conceptual and philosophical issues but
prompts the first of a number of major questions which must be addressed
if we are to aspire to a unified social science: what sort of model of the indi-
vidual is (at the micro level 2) appropriate when an explanation of the sys-
tem state is sought? This observation enables one to draw some conclusions
about the limited role which individual psychology will play in any unified
social science. Psychologists and, indeed, many sociologists often allege that
economists adopt an over-simple model of the individual (i.e. usually ratio-
nal, calculating and self-interested). Maybe they do, but the important point
is, nevertheless, that the social sciences should only adopt the simplest model
of the individual consistent8 with validated psychology theory, which can in
turn contribute to an account of the system state. This being the case, the
social sciences will not always, or even usually, shift with changing fashions in
our understanding of individual psychology. Unfortunately many sociolo-
5. In general economists will take the bottom left-hand corner in Figure 1 as exogenous, com-
prising preferences and beliefs (expectations), though recently an interest in endogenous
preferences and expectations has arisen. This apart, economists tend to model societal
(macro) influences on individuals in terms of opportunities.
6. As we shall see below, what should and should not be taken as exogenous is an issue that cur-
rently divides the social sciences. Sociologists, because their discipline lacks rigour, tend to
criticize economists for taking things as exogenous without themselves facing the techni-
cal responsibilities of not doing so. Figure 1 could conceivably invite an endogenous theo-
ry of ‘social norms’ by elaborating the diagram backwards in time (see also footnote 2).
7. Note the type 3 arrow appears here to be one of aggregation (not causality)!
8. The idea here is that the social scientist’s model of the individual can ignore minute psy-
chological detail, but the degree to which this is analytically appropriate often depends
upon the number of actors at the micro level. It is a matter of what is sometimes called
supervenience. Generally the more refined the macro dynamics, the more refined the model
of the individual.
On the Prospects For a Unified Social Science: Economics and Sociology Papers 80, 2006 127
Papers 80 001-312  13/12/06  10:53  Página 127gists have not taken this lesson to heart, with the result that a type of litera-
ture has evolved which tries to locate ever more refined ways of understand-
ing individuals and their interactions. Social scientists have very little to learn
from this literature9.
Sociologists frequently promote their discipline as one which involves the
study of social interaction and exchange (Coleman, 1990). Accordingly, level
2 mechanisms then need to capture the idea whereby ‘the conditions of action’
(bottom left-hand corner of Figure 1) describe how others impact the actions
of each focal individual10. Instructively, economists are also concerned with
economic exchange between (exogenously endowed11) individuals, but abstract
away from detailed descriptions of such exchanges in their most vaunted
achievement: general equilibrium theory12. They do so to avoid the need to
chart the details of non-equilibrium exchanges. How and why they do this is
an issue I shall return to, but again it is tied up with the adoption of an appro-
priate simplification in the search for, in this case, a highly stylized equilibri-
um macro state.
As soon as the idea of (social) interaction is given a central role in our
endeavours, it is essential to draw a basic distinction between those models
which are parametric and those which are strategic. If actors can be modelled as
responsive to their ‘conditions of action’, which may, amongst other things,
include other actors’ actions that may be treated as fixed and are not them-
selves responsive to the focal actor, then the conditions are parametric. The
canonical model here is the aforementioned general equilibrium theory, where
at equilibrium fixed prices determine purchasing actions.If, however, we need to
understand how actors reason about the way other actors will act in response
to their own actions (and vice versa), then the situation becomes strategic. This
distinction is central to modern economic theory but rarely explicitly acknowl-
edged by sociologists13. It should be, though, and I believe an understanding
of how, why and when we should adopt one approach rather than the other
may provide one useful ingredient in establishing a unified social science.
Indeed, matters go even deeper: sometimes we may wish to model individuals
in terms of what, in the natural sciences, is termed an ‘independent individual
approximation’. That is to say, in order to approximate highly complex micro
dynamics one discards the idea of interaction altogether, replacing it with some
general (or average) situated environment. Let me take an example from my own
research into generalized reciprocity and social capital. A collection of n indi-
9. The exception here might be when the number of actors at level 2 is small.
10. This would be true even if the appropriate micro level were ‘above’ the individual (e.g.groups
in relation to society).
11. Usually endowed with preferences and resources. That is, the bottom left-hand corner of
Figure 1 is exogenous: no type 1 mechanisms.
12. I hasten to add that this avoidance of the detail of exchanges is not found in many eco-
nomic theories, especially game-theoretic strategic theories.
13. One might suggest that sociologists’ conception of social interaction is nearly always implic-
itly strategic (Abell,1996b).
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complex network of dyadic strategic interactions14). So, individual helping
actions are ‘caused’ by specific others helping actions. In practice, however, we
may (particularly when n is large) discard the strategic details of the micro
dynamics and adopt the standpoint of ‘the characteristic individual’ in a ‘mean
helping environment’. It should be borne in mind, nevertheless, that the the-
oretical generation of such a parametric environment, which provides a pic-
ture of the mean effects of other actors on each focal actor in turn, although hav-
ing the appearance of an exogenous parametric force, impacting each individual,
is in fact endogenously generated15. Theoretical sociologists have often appeared
lax in not appropriately marking this distinction and, in particular, have shown
little sensitivity to how the nature of theories may change as n dwindles. Indeed,
the literature on agency and structure (e.g. Giddens, 1989) seems to have
evolved in complete innocence of these sorts of issues, contributing to what I
have elsewhere termed a fugitive paradigm (Abell and Reyniers, 2001). If social
theory is to acquire greater intellectual bite, then its practioners will need to
transcend this sort of innocence. A drive towards unified theory may, perhaps,
help in this respect.
Economists also handle situations of interdependent strategic complexity,
inherent in economic exchanges, in a rather similar manner in their general
equilibrium theory. Arrow (1983) writes of general equilibrium as follows: ‘the
key points in the definition are the parametric role of the prices for each indi-
vidual and the identity of price for all individuals’. Again these prices are gen-
erated endogenously but they appear (at equilibrium) rather like exogenous
parametric forces. General equilibrium, however, provides no picture as to
how equilibrium prices arise. The theoretical structure abstracts away from
pre-equilibrium exchange (i.e. interactions) between individuals16. So, in both
sociology and economics it does appear that, at least when n is large, there
may be some common ground in reducing the complexity of strategic inter-
actions to more tractable parametric models. We need to look at this possi-
bility more closely in the context of unification.
14. Generalized reciprocity of help is usually modelled strategically as a trust or Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. See Abell and Reyniers (2000).
15. Sociologists refer to the use of mean effects of this sort as cross-level or structural effects.
In the context of Figure 1, complex (strategic) interactions at level 2 are being approxi-
mated by a mean in the appropriate population. One could conceive the mean level con-
cept at the top left corner.
16. Tatonnement is, of course, the word used, under the auspices of the Walrasian auction-
eer, to describe the groping towards equilibrium (but this is not based upon pairwise
exchanges or interactions). Interestingly, models of dyadic economic exchange of the
Edgeworth sort do converge upon competitive equilibrium prices as n increases. Once
again we may note that the style of theory which is appropriate depends upon n. The con-
vergence of these two ways of looking at markets is a conspicuous sign of the maturity
and rigour of economics. Such convergences are common in the natural sciences but total-
ly absent from sociology (I suspect because of the low standards of intellectual rigour in the-
oretical sociology).
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from sociology— is the concept of equilibrium17. Economists will almost invari-
ably start by trying to show how optimizing individuals will drive the system
towards a steady state. Sociologists rarely think in these terms. But should they?
Should the social sciences be preoccupied with explaining time invariant sys-
tem states at the top right-hand corner of Figure 1? Sociologists have failed to for-
mulate any general theoretical framework which deploys a clear concept of equi-
librium, though much empirical research is conducted and reported in a way
which implicitly assumes that distributions (e.g. the distribution of individual
states/actors at the bottom right-hand corner of Figure 1) have found a steady
state18. In fact, this observation raises a further issue concerning explanations
at level 3. Macro stability (equilibrium) does not invariably imply micro stabil-
ity but the reverse may often be true19. Neither sociologists nor economists have
fully embraced the implications of this fact and thought through the interplay
of macro and micro dynamics inherent in the context of micro interactions.
Formulating theories in terms of equilibrating dynamics will only succeed empir-
ically if the context of the dynamic process itself is not perturbed. One way of
expressing the sociologist’s reserve about ‘equilibrium’ is precisely that such per-
turbations are, as a consequence of innovations of one sort or another, endem-
ic. So interactive micro processes may, at best, only be conceived as temporari-
ly approaching a steady macro state, before lurching off towards yet another
one. Such processes will not give any impression of equilibration unless a hero-
ically impossible level of empirical detail is available20, though random varia-
tions at the micro level may have the effect of selecting a particular equilibrium
in multiple equilibria contexts and local interactions. Certainly as n increases it
may prove empirically impossible to check the micro dynamics. There are per-
haps two possible reactions to this situation. First, the micro level may be discarded
altogether; that is, analysis is then confined to level 4 with a possible commitment
to an ontology of system level entities21 and a macro equilibrium. Secondly,
17. I shall use the term equilibrium to mean a steady state in macro dynamics (Figure 1).
18. In this respect some summary characteristics of a micro distribution are used to describe
the macro state (Figure 1). Sometimes, but seldom, the distribution is conceived as a sto-
chastic process (e.g. a finite Markov chain) which may of course have a dynamic equilibri-
um. Because social theories are rarely rigorously formulated, whether or not the structural
distribution is at a dynamic equilibrium is rarely thought through. Some social theorists
use the term equilibrium but unfortunately rarely in a coherent fashion.
19. This is an aspect of supervenience which would dictate that the macro is supervenient on
the micro if and only if the macro does not distinguish any state that cannot be distin-
guished at the micro level. It is generally held that macroscopic properties do not super-
vene upon the microscopic in the physical sciences. The situation in the social sciences is,
however, more debatable; see Abell (1996b). If supervenience is absent, then the map
between micro and macro dynamics is many to many.
20. In the extreme, of course, only of the ‘history’ of the system can be described.
21. That is, to a Durkheimian or structuralist approach. It is sometimes suggested that this
approach involves emergent concepts (and equilibria) in the sense that such concepts have
no corresponding concepts at the micro level.
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amongst these are assumptions of homogeneous individuals, and a suppression
of any interaction (parametric or strategic) between individuals leading to an
‘independent individual approximation’ (Auyang, 1998).
So let me now draw together the lessons of this introductory section. If we
aspire to a unified social science, and by this I mean to explain a system (macro)
level state, then:
— Which model(s) of the individual should we adopt (if indeed any at all)?
— What models of interaction should we adopt?
— What role should steady state (equilibria) take in our deliberations?
— How should we conceive of the relationship between the micro and macro
dynamics? Is there any room for emergence?
2. Models of the individual
Economists have, of course, almost invariably settled upon the rational choice
(or action) model of the individual as foundational to their micro theories.
The details of what this implies do vary but this need not detain us here.
Broadly speaking, individuals are conceived as taking choices (actions in the
sociologists’ parlance) which (1) optimize their (2) self-regarding exogenous-
ly fixed preferences, given (3) their expectations (or beliefs) about the conse-
quences of the chosen and other possible actions (their opportunities)22.
Sociologists, on the other hand, have variously rejected each one of these
assumptions though they have not yet arrived at a widely accepted alternative.
Indeed, those of a Durkheimian (or sometimes called structuralist23) persua-
sion dismiss the need for a model of the individual at all. For the moment,
however, let us put structuralism to one side24. Is there any way of beginning
to reconcile micro sociology and economics?
Sociologists have, more or less explicitly (Turner, 1996), proposed a wide
variety of models of the individual, many deriving from the phenomenologi-
cal tradition, which are far too detailed to stand as serious candidates, parti-
cularly when n is large and a social explanation (as I have defined it) is sought.
It is important, however, not to misinterpret this remark. These models are
not necessarily in any sense wrong; rather they cannot reasonably be expected
to enter into systematic explanations of the social, when n is large. All we can
ask is that our models are not inconsistent with them. The same applies, of
course, to detailed psychological models. Cutting away from this diversity, two
related contenders appear prominent. First, what I shall call the ‘interactive,
22. This usually leads to a model which maximizes expected utility. Prospect theory is, of course,
a development (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). It is also important that preferences and
opportunities are formed independently.
23. The word structuralist has been given many other imprecise meanings by sociologists.
24. If we interpret structuralism as an exclusive attention to level 4, then we would need to
find a concept of ‘social causality’ not derivable from micro causality (see below).
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or another (up to innovation25) deriving their actions (or decision to act) from
those with whom they interact (or perhaps observe interacting with others).
Although sociologists have not characteristically drawn the distinction, it is
perhaps important, in the light of my earlier remarks, to distinguish in this
respect between parametric and strategic interactions (socialization). Secondly,
the idea whereby individuals follow exogenous norms (or the normative expec-
tations of others26). The two contenders can, however, for the purposes of this
essay, be brought into contact since it is useful to conceive of norm-learning (i.e.
normative socialization) in terms of an interactive dynamic27. I shall later pro-
pose that if it is the case that optimal choice lies at the centre of micro eco-
nomics, then equally interactive socialization plays a similar role in sociology.
If so, the question then arises as to how they may be brought together within
a unified perspective.
Returning to the rational choice perspective, many sociologists opine that peo-
ple just do not, in fact, make decisions (carry out actions) which follow some or
all of the various precepts of rational choice. And, of course, they are often cor-
rect; it would take very little effort to spot human activities where it would
prove difficult to bring them under the auspices of the perspective. But this is
to miss the point. We should judge the claims of the rational choice model as
a rigorous and parsimonious conception of the individual which is often (not
necessarily always) empirically more successful in predicting social states (top
right-hand corner of Figure 1) than others. It should be noted that this is, from
the sociologist’s standpoint, an empirical claim, not an a priori theoretical or
normative one. It is nevertheless perplexing to encounter sociologists claiming
on a priori grounds that rational choice can never (rarely) in this respect pro-
vide an adequate framework. Surely sociologists, given the relative success of
economics, must find overwhelmingly secure grounds for rejecting rational
choice, at least as a starting point28. Furthermore, since what we might term
the strict rational choice model (broadly speaking, maximizing expected utili-
ty) may be subjected to a wide range of systematic adjustments whilst staying
within the broad ambit of the theory (e.g. embracing bounded rationality, rel-
ative utility, time-inconsistent preferences, other-regarding sentiments, subjec-
tive optimization, various cognitive biases29), this should further give sociolo-
25. I shall deal with innovation below, but this raises my earlier point about the fleeting nature
of a particular equilibrium.
26. Role theory, where people as role holders always follow the normative expectations of other
role incumbents, is the most detailed version of this approach. Role theory has, though,
had only a marginal impact upon empirical sociology and has been accused of promoting
an ‘over socialized view of individuals’.
27. I shall try to justify the assertion below.
28. To do so would be to contravene the proposition that people often do the best for themselves
in a situation, as they understand it.
29. I am thinking here of, for example, prospect theory. The various biases supported by this
theory may, of course, be interpreted as (sometimes) invalidating expected utility theory.
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pared to permit this rather broad interpretation of the rational choice model, then
it is imperative to ask what amongst the ‘strict’ precepts one must ultimately
hang on to whilst still remaining within the jurisdiction of the model. I think
it is the idea of optimization, for it is this idea that enables the analyst to make
predictions about which actions will be ‘chosen’ whatever are the preferences
or partial understanding or cognitive biases which encumber individuals. If
sociologists can find a leading idea which can rival, shall we call it, ‘subjective opti-
mization’, then an intelligible debate might become possible.
The inclusiveness inherent in my catholic interpretation of rational choice
might, whilst allaying the fears of some sociologists and psychologists, never-
theless offend economists. Rightly, the latter often opine; if we are willing to
assume in a post hoc manner any sort of preferences or distortions in reasoning,
then our theories become well nigh irrefutable. Furthermore, they continue, in
what sense is the behaviour/action studied still deemed to be rational?
I adopt what is, I suspect, a rather heterodox and pragmatic view of these
matters.Where the boundary should be drawn between what is and is not
rational is, I think, of no great moment. The important point is that a very
simple model of actions —expected utility theory— provides not only a first
explanatory resort, but also a rigorous framework in which the modifications
I mentioned above can be progressively introduced. Could we imagine prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) in the absence of expected utility the-
ory? Ultimately a point arrives when it may no longer be helpful to think in
terms of modifications of the latter —but only ultimately (see, for instance, a
wonderful review paper by Rabin, 1998). Certainly, the research agenda, which
embraces the incorporation of psychological insights into rational choice the-
ory, demonstrates a rigour that, by contrast, makes much micro sociology look
rather insubstantial. The concern about post hoc irrefutability must of course
always provide cause for concern. But equally worrying are economists’ attempts
to furnish often highly ingenious standard rational choice interpretations of
events when an empirically available alternative interpretation, which requires
some adjustment of the standard theory, is at hand. I think the answer here,
whilst it will not be palatable to many economists, is for us to learn something
from sociology and to draw morereadily upon empirically derived testimony
of actors (Manski, 1995, Chapter 5). For instance, the repeatedly observed
willingness of players to punish in one-shot ultimatum games can, if one wish-
es, be derived from strict rational choice precepts and an assumption whereby
the players think they will in fact be involved in repeated encounters (Gale et
al., 1995). However, a little testimony would, no doubt, often reveal a sense of
justice and retribution to be involved.
However, I think it more sensible to see them as extending and developing the theory.
Similarly also, for instance, Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (2001) theory of Case-Based Decisions
is conceived as extending rational choice to situations where expected utility does not work
well.
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is that it provides space for dynamic models in which biases and incomplete
information may be progressively eliminated in the course of individual or
social learning. This brings us close to sociology once again, for it can imply
learning through interaction or socialization. We should nonetheless be cautious
about the universal directionality of ‘learning’. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
amongst others point to ‘errors of application’, which show that individuals
who are in possession of appropriate rational principles may not apply them in
repeated particular cases. Furthermore, even experts may be overconfident
in unpredictable situations.
But how does rational choice theory relate to the sociologists’ emphasis
upon interactively learned ‘normative action’? Empirically one can scarcely
doubt that individuals often appear to follow rules or the normative expecta-
tions of others rather than to consciously deliberate along the lines required
by the precepts of rational choice. The most influential sociological model of
‘normative behaviour’ —role theory— usually takes the normative expecta-
tions which one role holder has of another as exogenous. Thus, social life is
largely a matter of learning (socialization) and then abiding by the appropri-
ate rules30. Again the picture is often proffered by sociologists as a theoretical
insight, but, surely, it is rather an empirical one. Do people sometimes, often,
always behave so (i.e.act)? The answer, I suspect, is perhaps frequently, but
certainly sometimes. Economists and those sociologists who choose to adopt
a rational choice perspective would, however, when faced with empirical evi-
dence of normative actions, seek to endogenize either or both the generation
and diffusion of the norms. These objectives would these days also usually be
approached from an evolutionary rational choice (often game theory) stand-
point. Clearly an interesting question is whether or not norm following is,
indeed, optimal and can be constructed as an equilibrium (Elster, 1989). These
questions are not normally ones which sociologists ask within the framework
of role theory. But there is clearly room here for a unified approach. It is par-
tially a matter of what should be taken as exogenous. Role theorists put the
norms (normative expectations) in this position, whilst economists in effect
take self-regarding preferences and expectations (i.e. beliefs) about outcomes and
constraints as exogenous31 and go on to ask how norms could have evolved.
However, evolutionary arguments merely shift the sociologists’ objection about
rational choice to an earlier date that cannot be directly empirically tested
other than by the actions themselves, which are licensed by the norms. Certainly,
in my view, there is now ample evidence from both evolutionary biology and
30. Defying the norms gives the starting point for an understanding of ‘deviant behaviour’.
31. They often do this in the context of an abstract evolutionary test of the optimality of the
norms. Furthermore, economists will deploy much ingenuity in order to preserve the assump-
tion of rational choice, particularly self-interest. So, for instance, altruistic norms will char-
acteristically be derived from provident self-interest. It is here that sociologists will often
demur, also some economists (Fehr and Gachter, 2000).
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nature of personkind (Rabin, 1998). Furthermore, norms may evolve in a
path-dependent manner from prior normatively constrained situations (Elster,
1989; Abell, 1996a). Be this as it may, there is ample room for an open and
constructive debate between economists and sociologists, but this will only be
achieved if theoretical sociologists begin to acquaint themselves with the tech-
nical rigour of evolutionary dynamics and game theory (see below). Although
treating norms as optimally evolved and diffused brings into relief the appro-
priateness of assumptions about self-regarding rational choice, it can also cen-
tre our attention upon the mechanisms of social interaction and socialization
whereby norms are learned and transmitted in populations. It seems to me it
is here that the ideas which may underpin a unified social science may be
sought —by promoting an understanding of when and how socialization takes
place in the context of social interaction. Indeed, it may well prove useful to sway
somewhat in the direction of sociology by interpreting rational choices (or
even bounded rational choices) as embodying particular sorts of norms (ratio-
nal norms!). It could be that interactive socialization then plays a part in estab-
lishing metanorms (normative expectations) indicating situations where either
rational calculation or some other sort of normative compliance is what is
expected of one (Abell, 1996a). In an evolutionary framework rational choice
may still, however, triumph as its precepts may show how the ‘situations’ have
evolved. I believe, however, Elster (1989) is substantially right when he doubts
that all social norms can be deemed as optimally evolved. Certainly it is uncon-
troversial that some norms endure beyond the time when the their rational
grounding is pertinent (e.g. shaking hands as a sign that one is not about to
draw one’s sword). But, furthermore, selection processes in uncertain envi-
ronments will not necessarily follow an optimizing path. Although it then fol-
lows that ‘rational choice’ theory will, in some way, fail, the very failure prompts
a search for an explanation of an anomaly which is conceived within the frame-
work of the theory. In this sense rational choice possesses some paradigmatic
privilege (Abell,1996b).
Before moving on, I should like here to insert a personal conjecture.
Although I have in this section of the paper argued for an intellectual accom-
modation between the rational choice and interactive socialized models of the
individual, my own view is that we will, in addition, have to find some room
for personkind as responsive to ideas of justice. Although this troublesome
word can mean many things in different institutional contexts, I am continu-
ally impressed by how both altruistic and malign intentions can arise in the
context of ubiquitous feelings about justice or fairness, in social interactions
(particularly reciprocity). I doubt we can understand much of the social world
without taking this into account (and not just as enlightened self-interest in
repeated interactions). Fortunately there is some indication that at least some
economists may partially agree (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; though,
for orthodoxy, see Gale et al., 1995).
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Most sociologists believe that an understanding of the causes and consequences
of social interaction lies at the heart of their discipline; though, if we are to
follow my earlier injunction, such understanding is not to be pursued per se but
only in so far as some macro state can, in turn, be explained. The approach
we may adopt in modelling social interactions is significantly governed by
three factors: first, the number of interactants and interactions (i.e. at level 2
in Figure 1); secondly, whether the interactions are conceived as parametric
or strategic; and thirdly, whether the consequences are of a significant (i.e.
motivating) magnitude to those involved.
Whereas a model of the individual that puts optimal choices at the centre of
things is the guiding micro principle for most economists, the parallel principle
for sociologists is one which promotes interactive socialization to a similar posi-
tion.To put it succinctly, people derive their courses of action not from deliber-
ation but from their experience of what others have done in the past (or are cur-
rently doing). At least, for many sociologists, this would provide a ‘baseline’ model
which may, nevertheless, be tampered with in various ways (see below) but which
would often be subject to systematic or random ‘innovation’ of one sort or anoth-
er (i.e. novel actions or unpredictable shifts in action). At a more disaggregate
level, sociologists see individual (social) actions as driven by beliefs, affects and
values (norms), each of which may be derived in one way or another from those
with whom they, often for exogenous reasons, interact. Accordingly sociologists
may want to think in terms of modelling those mechanisms (i.e. types of inter-
action) which underpin cognitive, affective and valuative socialization. This pic-
ture, needless to say, also covers normatively driven actions. Just, however, as
economists need a rather simple model of the individual (especially when n is
large), sociologists also need simple models of interactive socialization. I am not
certain what these should be, though I shall make some proposals below.
The challenge underlying the search for a unified social science is one of
finding an intellectual accommodation between the relaxed rational choice
and interactive models. One apparent way of universally achieving this needs,
however, to be discarded at the outset. Economists might naturally see inter-
active socialization merely as a recipe for endogenizing those preferences, expec-
tations and opportunities which are the ingredients of a standard rational
choice interpretation32. This is, of course, a possible and attractive option open
to exploration as sometimes true. But I think a rather more elaborate picture
is needed if sociologists are to be brought on board. A second apparently attrac-
tive route also needs, from a sociologist’s standpoint, to be approached rather
cautiously. A hard line rational choice theorist would wish to endogenize the
32. Note that sociologists speak of beliefs, values and affects, whereas economists use the terms
expectations, preferences and opportunities. They can, I think, be transposed. I shall use
the economists’ terms (see Elster, 1989) as economic theory is so much better developed
and it is, thus, sociologists’ responsibility to adapt.
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ture would be chosen under the auspices of rational choice theory); namely as
the result of optimal search. Most sociologists will resist this possibility, either
as a universal or even initial analytical prescription. Their insight is that many
actions (or their constituent beliefs, affects and values) are derived from interac-
tions with others who are not chosen in any conscious sense (for the purpose
at hand). For this reason the structure of interaction (i.e. with whom one inter-
acts) is usually postulated as exogenous (Coleman, 1990). Clearly, this cannot
be a universal analytical prescription either. It is, of course, also feasible that
we derive from our interactions guidance as to when and when not to choose
rationally and, thus, when and when not to derive things from others.
Furthermore, this derivation may also sometimes be the rational thing to do,
particularly if deliberation is costly and others are deemed better informed
(Conlisk, 1980)! So, where does this leave us? It is not, I believe, entirely clear,
but what is evident is that it may be worth asking, in the absence of our abil-
ity to endogenize everything pertinent to an understanding of human action,
what, when and where should be taken as exogenous.
Although the idea of social interaction is put at centre stage by most soci-
ologists, the discipline has not developed widely accepted ways of understanding
the mechanisms involved. Clearly, social interactions may appear extremely
complicated and certain theoretical tendencies have consequently driven in
the direction of descriptive exhaustiveness33. But what is required, particular-
ly when the number of interactants and interactions is large, is a rather sim-
ple and robust model. The interactive mechanisms which can (partially) deter-
mine the actions of individuals (level 2 in Figure 1) will be as varied as are the
descriptions of the ‘conditions of action’. In this respect, as we have noted,
economists usually deploy the vocabulary of exogenous preferences, expecta-
tions and opportunities, whereas sociologists speak of values, beliefs, affects
and norms. Actions can, in principle, be shaped by interactions impacting
upon any one or a number of these descriptors.
I should like to contrast three models of interaction as follows:
(i) The endogenous structure model.
(ii) The endogenous interaction exogenous structure model (structural effects).
(iii) The exogenous interaction exogenous structure model (contextual effects).
The endogenous structure model (type i) is closest to the classical ratio-
nal choice perspective. Individuals exogenously endowed/placed with ‘condi-
tions of action’ (Figure 1) (e.g. preferences, beliefs and opportunities) gener-
ate a structure of interaction (with other individuals) in search of ‘information’
which may in turn modify their conditions and, thus, their prior actions. This
is the approach with which sociologists appear not to be very happy as they
are inclined to see most situations as ones where there is a received (exoge-
33. As n dwindles, the complex models may become more appropriate.
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in terms of the co-evolution of structures and the actions of individuals.
Meanwhile, we may look to Jackson and Wolinsky (1998) for the most promis-
ing approach, from a sociologist’s standpoint, to endogenizing structure.
Starting from a rational choice perspective, these authors search for equilibrium
structures where both direct and indirect links bring benefits (e.g. informa-
tion) but where actors only bear the costs of direct links. In this set-up indirect
links can provide a positive externality for those who make use of them but,
nevertheless, do not sustain the cost of their maintenance. It is really the opti-
mality assumption of the rational choice perspective which does the hard work
here. One could easily modify the model, by introducing altruistic and/or
malign objectives or, indeed, any others. This observation underscores my
earlier remark about the flexibility of rational choice theory. I have argued for
a number of years now (1996b) that a judicious combination of network and
rational choice ideas can provide the framework for the construction of gen-
uine social theory.
Sociologists are, however, inclined to make their opening gambit with a
model which makes the structure of interaction exogenous (often constructed
for ‘other reasons’)34. Then the simplest model (type ii) is one where the focal
actors/agents merely derive (perhaps in an iterative manner) their actions (or
their observable outcomes) from those actors to whom they are (exogenous-
ly) connected (Doreian, 1981; Friedkin, 1990). This leads (at the micro level 2
in Figure 1) to patterns of endogenous interaction (structural effects) within the
framework of an exogenous structure. Sociologists, however, often in addition
postulate (type iii) patterns of exogenous interaction, i.e. what they often term
‘contextual effects’.
As Manski (1995, Chapter 7) has observed, there appears to be a marked
tendency for sociologists to theorize in terms of endogenous interaction but
then to empirically test contextual models. Since both mechanisms are con-
currently possible, it is important to clearly separate them, both theoretically
and empirically, and also to differentiate them from any ‘correlation effects’35.
An outline example may make these ideas rather more accessible. Assume
we are interested in how the actions of individuals helping others (bottom
right-hand corner of Figure 1) contribute to ‘group cohesion’ (top right-hand
corner). Group cohesion may be conceptualized as the mean level of helping
within a group (arrow 3 is then one of aggregation). Our intellectual concern,
34. Such an analytical starting point seems quite consistent with the precepts of institutional-
ism in economics.
35. See Manski (1995). Correlation effects arise when individuals are grouped and the group-
ing variable(s) correlates with the endogenous variable. Identification problems arise in sep-
arating the impact of endogenous and exogenous interactions and correlation effects. Lagged
models help to sort out these problems but this directs attention to an understanding of
the dynamics of interaction effects. This could be an active area of research in any attempt
to generate a unified social science.
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now pose the question about how the ‘conditions of helping actions’ (type 2
mechanism in Figure 1) generate the distribution of actual helping of others
within groups. An endogenous interaction and exogenous structure mecha-
nism (ii above) would work from assumptions that:
(a) a ‘historical’ structure of ‘who interacts with whom’ is given (imposed!)
(exogenous);
(b) helping actions (the endogenous variable) are shaped (stochastically) by:
— a vector of exogenous personal variables (e.g. gender, age, ‘perception
of outside group opportunities’, etc.)
— the auto-correlation of the endogenous variable (i.e. helping), in virtue
of (a), which determines the pattern of social interaction.
In a large n situation the details of the exogenous structure may be prac-
tically unobservable and replaced by, say, the mean level of help within the
group (sociologists call these ‘structural effects’). If this is done, of course, it
is better to think in terms of a dynamic (lagged) model since ‘help’ appears on
both sides of the estimation equation (see footnote 35).
If we add to this picture (which you may think is already complicated
enough) the possibility of exogenous auto-correlation (contexted effects) where-
by the (exogenous) structure (a) also, for instance, introduces inter-individual
patterns of interaction determining the ‘perception of outside group oppor-
tunities’, then we are in the realm of model (iii) above. Relaxing assumption (a)
then leads to the additional complication that the structure of who interacts with
whom is itself not given. These are the sorts of issues that serious social theo-
ry is going to have to address if common ground with economists is to be
found. Since I wrote the first draft of this paper I find a start has been made
(Durlauf and Young, 2001).
4. Combining rational choice and interaction
If we may conceive of a unified social science wherein a relaxed conception of
individual rationality is carefully combined with dynamic notions of social-
ization through interaction, then what is the theoretical way forward?
Sociologists have developed a number of dynamic models where the interac-
tion is by and large parametric, usually depending upon simple density depen-
dence contact or copying36 (Coleman, 1964). These more or less complex
deterministic and stochastic diffusion models have, however, not entered main-
stream social theory to any appreciable extent (though see Fararo, 1989).
Furthermore, over the years a number of empirical studies have made use of con-
36. Coleman introduced diffusion models where estimates of the rate constants can be derived
from the (exogenous) structure of interaction.
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value of the appropriate variable is used to proxy the details of micro interac-
tions (Hauser, 1970; Jenks and Mayer, 1989; Crane, 1991; Mayer, 1991). But
again, even though to ignore such effects, if they exist, will bias the estimated
impact of any exogenous variables, empirical sociologists still almost invari-
ably assume micro unit independence37. Few systematic attempts have been
made, at the theoretical level, to explicitly model interactions. This, however,
is the direction we must go in to return to the roots of the discipline.
In doing so it is probable that the analysis of strategic rather than para-
metric interactions will gain in prominence (Abell, 2001). This being the
case, it is in the direction of some adaptation of evolutionary game theory
that we might look for a unifying theoretical inspiration. One attraction of
doing so, from the sociologists’ standpoint, is that evolutionary game theo-
ry has no need of strong rationality assumptions. Rather, dynamic interac-
tive processes are usually deemed to myopically procure rationality over a
period of time. Thus, equilibrium is not achieved as a consequence of ratio-
nal actions, but actors acquire rationality if and when an equilibrium is
achieved. With myopic adjustment, because actors do not take account of
how their own actions affect others, they behave as though the world is sta-
tionary even though it is not. But this is a useful approximation. Furthermore,
the equilibrium can be disturbed in a predictable manner by the entry of new
actions/strategies (i.e. equilibrium disturbing innovations, as noted above,
are often urged by sociologists). These conceptions of equilibrium and ratio-
nality, thus, seem rather compatible with many traditional sociological con-
cerns. Evolutionary models work well when n is large (or alternatively, the
number of interactions is large), the strategic situations modelled are not over-
complicated and the ratio of pay-off returns to learning and switching costs
(i.e. changing strategy) are of sufficient magnitude to motivate actors. Much
of the early work on evolutionary models has assumed patterns of random
pairwise interactions between actors38. Sociologists will wish, however, to
complicate this picture in several respects. First, as we saw earlier, they will
often start with an exogenous structure of interaction (i.e. a picture of who
interacts with whom). In large social systems this structure will characteris-
tically comprise a loosely linked aggregate of more densely interacting local sys-
tems. We have little knowledge of how to model and sample from such systems
(Marsden, 1990), though it is significant that it is not sociologists but econ-
omists who have made a start39. Furthermore,sociologists will also want to
37. We need to control for exogenous and endogenous interaction effects in order to ascertain
the independent effect of any exogenous variables. This observation tends to suggest that the
routine use of regression-based models (without allowances for interactions) is not appro-
priate.
38. Simple diffusion models also have this characteristic.
39. I refer here to stochastic stability with local interaction, e.g. Blume (1993, 1995) and Ellison
(1993,1995).
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will enhance (weaken) the probability of future use (i.e. learning by using
a relationship). So, we will need to model the dynamics of the structure
of interaction itself. We will, thus, begin to think in terms of the co-evo-
lution of the structure of interaction and the actions (strategies) of the
actors.
Secondly, sociologists will allow for a (possibly evolving) ‘structure of observ-
ability’, whereby actors are able to observe and react to the interaction of others
(i.e. a picture of who observes whom interacting). Thirdly, as a consequence,
actors will acquire reputations (for acting in certain ways) which will change
through time. Thus, to put it succinctly, much more local detail in the pat-
terns of interaction and reference will be needed than is provided in most
current evolutionary models for them to prove convincing to sociologists. It
is, of course, in light of my earlier remarks concerning simple models of inter-
action, important to find some happy medium. It will not prove feasible for
instance to impose the detailed models sometimes used in small group research
when n grows [e.g. the full structural models as in Friedkin (1990)]. Some
progress has been made by adopting ‘neighbourhood effects’ into the evolu-
tionary dynamics of conventions derivative of simple coordination games
(Ellison, 1993). Multiple conventions (i.e. differing equilibria) are possible
which may even be non-exclusive (Sugden, 1995; Goyal and Janssen, 1997).
Although the diffusion models developed by sociologists have, by and large,
been parametric in inspiration, it may prove instructive to picture the spread
of ‘traits’ (e.g. beliefs, values, etc.) as essentially strategic (in the sense of find-
ing a coordination equilibrium).
The leading idea in evolutionary dynamics is that actors tend to switch,
according to some dynamics specification, from less successful to more suc-
cessful strategies (actions).The reference group for relative success can vary
with either or both of the structures of interaction or observability (which is
often taken to be the population). Three measures of success traditionally
enter the dynamic specification. First, the current success of a particular strat-
egy when interacting with other strategies; secondly, some measure of the
success of other strategies (e.g. their mean success or the most successful);
thirdly, the proportion (i.e. density) of the actors adopting the particular strat-
egy. Density-dependent dynamics will capture the historic success of a par-
ticular strategy, whereas relative success dynamics concentrate upon the cur-
rent situation. It will prove useful to conceive a continuum of dynamic models
ranging from, at one end, dynamics, which are purely density-dependent, to
the other end where, rather, they depend entirely upon success40. The standard
Taylor–Jonkers (replicator) dynamics can then be proven to lie at the centre
point of this continuum, weighting density and success equally (Bendor and
Swistak,1996).
40. Models will characteristically contain terms for both.
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most apposite where social interactions are what I above termed parametric.
The individual propensity to adopt a particular action (strategy) depends upon
the (perhaps local) density of contacts (exogenous structure) with others. The
question then arises as to how complicated the picture of (parametric) social
interaction should be. Simple deterministic and stochastic models of diffusion
(usually logistic in form with an upper equilibrium at a carrying capacity) have
dominated the field (Coleman, 1964). The model of interaction underlying
this dynamic formulation is one of simple pairwise interactions between those
with a ‘trait’ and those without. In the standard model, the rate of propaga-
tion of the trait is proportional to the product of the members with and with-
out the trait. This is appropriate where the (exogenous) structure is either com-
plete (i.e. each pair of interactants is equally likely), or incomplete but where
the interaction patterns are, nevertheless, random. Surely some unified theo-
retical and research programme is possible here, which will explore the steady
state implications of different dynamic specifications across the density to suc-
cess continuum matched, where appropriate, with different types of strategic
interactions. I suspect there are some rather deep theorems to be discovered
in this respect, signalling the sensitivity of steady state equilibria to different
dynamic models and the shape of the functions linking transition probabilities
with density and relative success.
It is already known that with stochastic dynamics and patterns of local
interactions path-independent equilibria are possible (Blume, 1993; Ellison,
1993) within the compass of a reasonable time period41. Sociologists have
always, in a rather ill-specified way, been inquisitive about when and where
history-dependent and -independent predictions hold. The framework with-
in which to think about these matters is now taking shape.
Sociologists will want to push things a little further by introducing sta-
tus (or reputation) and threshold effects into their dynamic picture. It is per-
haps useful to contrast the sociologists’ and economists’ treatment of sta-
tus/reputation. By and large economists have not tampered with standard
assumptions about arguments in utility functions when conceiving of repu-
tation effects. Rather, the acquisition of a reputation is almost invariably con-
ceived as instrumental to the achievement of standard utilities (usually in a
repeated game context, i.e. repeated interaction). Thus, it is in the rational
self-regard of actors to seek reputations. This is clearly the most parsimonious
way for economists to incorporate ‘status-seeking’ into their theories (Nowak
and Sigmund,1998).
Sociologists (Coleman,1990), on the other hand, in so far as they have
addressed the issues systematically, have often chosen to picture status as an
41. One may wish to think in terms of a larger continuum ranging from historical density
dependence (i.e. lagged measures of density) to forward-looking success measures (e.g.
rational expectations). The continuum mentioned in the text is, in effect, embedded in
this larger continuum.
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terms for relative success and density, but also status at some point on the den-
sity-success continuum. Whilst it seems initially sensible to follow the econo-
mists’ instrumental view-point, it may be that independent status-seeking does,
at some point, play a role in dynamics. The significance of this possibility can
be appreciated by considering Prisoner’s Dilemma type strategic interactions.
If the benefit (utility) derived from the status of cooperating is greater than
the cost of the cooperation, then the Prisoner’s Dilemma is transformed into
a coordination game. So, the nature of strategic interaction can be funda-
mentally transformed. Contrast, for instance, social capital interactions where:
(a) helping others leads to a reputation for helping (i.e. status) which, in turn,
increases the likelihood of being helped at a later date (i.e. generalized
reciprocity), and (b) helping confers status which boosts one’s utility. The issue
is that, depending upon the assumptions one makes, the dynamics will vary
dramatically. Furthermore, it does appear that independent status may well
acquire the characteristics of a relative utility measure. This being the case, the
status of others may exert a negative externality upon oneself (i.e. status is
derived from the difference between my reputation and yours and vice versa).
Here dynamics may lead to a status race without any increase in mean satis-
faction (utility). For example, happiness per capita does not seem to increase
with wealth per capita above a certain threshold. This may be an example of
emergent status effects (see next section).
Finally, sociologists (Granovetter, 1978, 1982) seem to believe that thresh-
old effects are endemic in dynamic processes. So, for instance, in a given pop-
ulation there will be a distribution of the probability of changing strategy
(action) depending upon the (often local) density of the strategy in the popu-
lation. Some will move easily, others with more difficulty. This may equally
apply to relative success.
The way of reasoning embodied in the preceding paragraphs depends upon
a large n and/or number of interactions. An important question is how we
might proceed if these numbers are not high (Abell, 2001) when narrative
models are, I believe, relevant (Abell, 1988). I shall, however, leave these mat-
ters to another occasion.
5. A note on the macro level (level 4) —emergence?
As noted earlier, sociologists often appear to seek formulations of causal con-
nections which operate exclusively at the macro level (level 4 in Figure 1). This
approach to matters I have variously described as the Durkheimian or struc-
turalist programme. Economists are less prone to this sort of endeavour, rather,
42. Stochastic dynamics without local interactions have a low probability of settling upon the
(risk dominant) equilibrium in coordination problems in a reasonable period of time. Thus,
in the face of multiple equilibria (e.g. coordination) the equilibria arrived at will be path-
dependent.
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nections. By this they usually mean that, in some way, connections between
macro states can be aggregated or deduced from assumptions (or perhaps obser-
vations) of connections between micro states. So in the simplest possible inter-
pretation, a specified functional (dynamic) relationship at level 2 (where mea-
sures pertain to individuals) could be aggregated so that the individual level
function form could be replaced by one in terms of, say, mean values43.
Although some empirically orientated sociologists (e.g. Hauser, 1970) have
taken a similar stance, leading to literatures on ecological correlation and con-
textual effects, there is no doubt that the issue of ‘reduction’ (or sometimes
called methodological individualism) does appear to significantly divide the
disciplines. In its most extreme manifestation we encounter many sociologists
claiming that (macro) sociological causal connections are in some sense irre-
ducible or emergent.
Emergence has two aspects: first, an assertion that macro concepts (states)
cannot be connected to micro concepts; secondly that the macro social causal
connection itself cannot be reduced to causal links 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 1.
Although the concept of emergence has acquired a number of meanings, I
should like to distinguish between strong and weak versions.By strong emer-
gence I shall mean the doctrine that in principle macro states cannot be reduced
to (or deduced from) micro states; nor can macro causal connections. Weak
emergence, on the other hand, may be used to describe situations where, in
practice, given our present intellectual understanding, it proves impossible to
find an acceptable micro reduction.
Related to strong emergence are three further ideas. First, the map from
macro states to micro may be many to one (the many to one map the other
way round is not controversial). Secondly, the idea that macro states cannot
be obtained by simply averaging or aggregating over micro states, particular-
ly in respect of inference 3 in Figure 1. Thirdly, if the micro dynamics at level 2
in Figure 1 turn out to be non-linear, then it is conceivable that chaotic regimes
will emerge. If so, they may be described as emergent since they are clearly not
supervenient. Whether chaotic regimes will play a significant role in the future
of social science is, I think, at the moment not clear. There is, of course, a lot
of loose talk, but that is all. Nevertheless, if as I have argued evolutionary
dynamics come to hold a central role, then ‘edge of chaos’ arguments may
come to prominence, as will networks ‘between order and randomness’
(Watts,1999).
I may not be well informed, but I suspect economists show little sympa-
thy with strong emergence. It is relatively easy to see why sociologists tend to
differ and speak of emergence. It is because they start with the idea of interaction
and thus are held, at the micro level, to modelling complex patterns of inter-
action, whereas economists are more likely to adopt an exogenously endowed
43. Status may also be best conceived as relative.
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need also, in order to render this approach cogent, to assume that individuals’
opportunities (feasibility set) and preferences are independent of each other.
So, even if economists suspect inter-individual interactions at level 2 in Figure 1,
they will, by and large, ignore them; to put it succinctly, they adopt an inde-
pendent individual approximation. This has the additional advantage that the
micro-macro connection (number 3 in Figure 1) can be interpreted as a mean
value. Sociologists face more difficulties in effecting reduction. But let us first
dispose of strongly emergent causality. Such would amount to the idea that
there is some form of ‘macro’ causality which is logically independent of micro
actions. I can attach no meaning to such an idea; of course, we may not be
able to formulate the causal structure implied by 1, 2 and 3 (Figure 1), but
this is a matter of weak, not strong, emergence.
Sociologists inspired, as we have had occasion to note, by Durkheim (and
structuralists) are inclined to speak of emergent ‘social forces’ acting at the top
left-hand corner of Figure 1 impacting the (social) outcome at the top right-
hand corner. But, if we can attach no clear meaning to the idea of ‘social causal-
ity’ (at level 4) operating independently of individual (micro) actions, then
what is really being claimed (Abell, 2001) is that any causality in fact runs
from the top left-hand corner to the bottom right-hand corner (as in Figure 2)44.
That is to say, causality operates independently of the structure of interaction
(context of individual action in Figure 1). Such causality can itself invite two
interpretations: first, non-emergent, whence mechanism 1(a) is merely the
transitive causal closure of the mechanisms working through 1 and 2. Note
44. Note this formulation in effect revises arrow 1 in Figure 1. The conditions under which
such aggregations can be effected are well understood.
Figure 2.
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Secondly, a causal picture whereby 1(a) operates independently of 1 and 2
either because the latter do not operate, or because they do operate alongside
mechanism 1(a). Certain diffusion models proposed by sociologists, for instance,
take these various forms where the rate of propagation can, variably, depend
upon pairwise interactions and the absolute number of non-converted indi-
viduals. The endogenous and exogenous interaction models mentioned above,
which proxy interactions by conditional expectations varying across reference
‘groups’, are non-emergent variants of this theme. They are, indeed, indepen-
dent individual approximations which are designed to suppress the minor
details of interactions in terms of a mean field effect. They, in practice, treat each
micro individual as reacting independently of others by an (intra-group) iden-
tical force (i.e. the appropriate conditional expectation).
We are now finally in a position to define a working model of weak emer-
gence. Relation 1(a) is weakly emergent if there exists no practical way of deriv-
ing it from an independent individual approximation. Thus, 1(a) may be
(weakly) emergent but 4 is the transitive closure of 1(a) and 3 and can only
be derivatively emergent if 1(a) happens to be so.
Returning to the theme of co-evolution: in general both social forces 1(a)
and interactive mechanisms (2) may determine actions and,thus,social actions.
But the mix can vary over time. At one extreme we have a ‘community’ where
interactive mechanisms solely determine the actions and at the other extreme
social forces (i.e. weak emergences) play this role. Note that when the latter is
the case the endogenous and contextual interaction model reduces to the impact
of correlation effects only.45
Thinking in these terms should, I trust, enable economists and sociolo-
gists to unite with a common perspective.
6. Conclusions
It is difficult to draw conclusions from a paper like the foregoing. So, rather than
try, let me anticipate one or two possible objections. First, why place such a
heavy emphasis upon social interaction (as the conditions of action)? I sup-
pose some will not agree that it is the sociologist’s leading idea; in particular
it may be asked what has happened to ‘culture’. Surely sociology is the ‘sci-
ence’ which promotes culture (however we define it) as the major shaping force
of our actions. There is, in fact, no inconsistency with this proposal and the
ideas I have promoted. Indeed, ‘culture’ may, for certain purposes, be taken
as exogenous, residing at the top left-hand corner of Figure 2, which then
45. Let y be the outcome, g a grouping variable and x an exogenous variable. Then:
E(y/g,x) = α + β1E (y/g) + β2(x/g) + β3g + β4x + µ
So when correlation effects solely operate, β = β = β = 0.1 2 3
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or 1(a) (i.e. as a ‘social force’). It, thus, by derivation fashions that ‘social out-
come’ through 4 (i.e. non-emergent). One notable way in which this could
be operative is through ‘focal point’ selection of equilibria at level 2 (Schelling,
1978).
Finally, some sociologists will promote various conceptions of ‘power’ as a
leading idea. Once again battle lines should not be drawn. Interactions involv-
ing both inter-personal and inter-group (class or whatever) power may well
be amongst the most important to study in determining actions and group
outcomes.
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